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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1563 
___________ 
 
GURPREET SINGH, 
              Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                       Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A208-676-674) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on November 14, 2017 
 
Before:  AMBRO, KRAUSE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 15, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Gurpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of an 
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the Immigration 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
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Judge’s (IJ) order of removal and denial of his requests for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  Because the 
BIA’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, we will deny the petition for 
review.   
I. Background 
Around three years ago, Singh, a Sikh living in Punjab, India, joined the Mann 
Party, a minority political party in that region.  He quickly became a visible supporter of 
the party, attending meetings and rallies and putting up posters around his community.  
Singh alleges that, as a result, he became a target of the rival Badal Party, Punjab’s 
majority party, whose members not only threatened him but violently attacked him two 
times, the second of which led to a 10-day stay in the hospital.  To help him avoid the 
threats and violence, Singh’s father sent him to stay with a family friend in Delhi, some 
300 miles from Punjab, but, after the threats continued, Singh left Delhi and eventually 
made his way to the United States to seek asylum.   
 The Department of Homeland Security instituted removal proceedings against 
Singh, after which he formally applied for asylum as well as withholding of removal and 
CAT protection.  After a hearing at which Singh testified, the IJ denied all three of his 
requests for relief and ordered him removed, concluding that he was not credible and that 
his corroborating evidence was insufficient.  The BIA upheld the IJ’s decision and 
dismissed Singh’s appeal.   
                                                                                                                                                  
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The BIA had jurisdiction over Singh’s appeal from the IJ’s removal order under 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3), and we have jurisdiction over his petition for review of the BIA’s 
final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Where the BIA issues its own opinion 
and relies on reasoning from the IJ’s opinion, we review both decisions.  Sandie v. Att’y 
Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo 
and its adoption of the IJ’s factual findings for substantial evidence.  Alimbaev v. Att’y 
Gen., 872 F.3d 188, 194, 196 (3d Cir. 2017).  Where, as here, the BIA also has adopted 
the IJ’s credibility determination, we give that determination “exceptional deference.”  Id. 
at 196.   
III. Discussion 
 In his petition for review, Singh challenges the IJ’s negative credibility finding 
and asserts that the IJ erred in rejecting the evidence corroborating his claims.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we reject both arguments. 
 A. The IJ’s Credibility Finding   
 Singh initially contends that the IJ’s credibility finding was based on three 
determinations that each lacked support in the record.  First, Singh disputes the IJ’s 
conclusion that it is implausible he would be targeted—at least to the extent he claimed—
for political persecution given that he was only a regular Mann Party worker.  In support 
of this challenge, Singh points to evidence in the record showing that “low level [Mann] 
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workers do face intimidation and political violence,” Pet. Br. 12, and argues that where 
an “IJ bases an adverse credibility determination in part on ‘implausibility’ . . . , such a 
conclusion will be properly grounded in the record only if it is made against the 
background of the general country conditions,” Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 249 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (en banc).  Here, however, the IJ considered such country conditions, 
accepting the possibility that Singh would be subject to “violence from members of 
opposing political parties,” but finding “not believable” the notion that, as a regular 
worker, Singh would be targeted by the Badal to the extent of, for example, an alleged 
“common effort” by Badal members to “locate him over 500 kilometers away” in Delhi.  
App. 9.  Significantly, the portions of the record that Singh identifies, which describe 
political violence in India in general terms, do not undermine the IJ’s conclusion on this 
point.   
 Second, Singh argues that the IJ erred in finding his affidavit inconsistent with his 
testimony as to whether, after he sought refuge in Delhi, Badal members traveled all the 
way from Punjab to Delhi to threaten him in person.  But, as the BIA correctly 
concluded, this finding also was adequately supported by the record.  Singh’s affidavit 
nowhere mentioned that he received in-person threats in Delhi, and while he 
subsequently testified that he did receive such threats, he failed to provide any clear 
explanation for his failure to include this information in his affidavit.   
Third, Singh asserts that the IJ erred in finding an inconsistency between, on the 
one hand, his testimony that he was attacked by Badal members on February 2, 2015, and 
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received treatment at a medical clinic that same day, and, on the other hand, a copy of the 
receipt from the medical clinic with a date reading “2-4-2015,” App. 10.  While Singh 
suggests that the IJ “fail[ed] to consider that it might simply be a mistaken date” on the 
receipt, Pet. Br. 11, the record shows, as the BIA noted, that the IJ did consider this 
possibility and found it “wholly unconvincing.”  App. 10.  Although we agree with Singh 
that an isolated instance of a witness being unable to “recall [the] specific . . . date[]” of 
an event that occurred more than a year earlier might not, on its own, amount to more 
than an “insignificant testimonial inconsistenc[y]” itself, Alimbaev, 872 F.3d at 198 
(quoting Chen v. Gonzalez, 434 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2005)), the other evidence on 
which the IJ relied here was sufficient, in any event, to justify his credibility 
determination.1 
 Singh also contends that the IJ’s credibility determination was based in part on 
two improper considerations outside the record: (1) the IJ’s dismissive observation that 
over the past year he had held hearings on “well over 75 Indian nationals seeking 
asylum” and nearly all of their applications were “based upon violence from Badal Party 
members,” App. 12; and (2) the IJ’s admission that he independently “conducted an 
Internet search” that cast doubt on a portion of Singh’s affidavit, App. 10.  Singh is 
                                              
1 Singh also points out that the IJ erred in finding an inconsistency between his 
testimony and his affidavit as to whether he had sought assistance from the Indian police.  
The BIA expressly recognized this finding was error but still held that the IJ’s negative 
credibility finding was “otherwise supported.”  App. 4.  For the reasons we have 
explained, we agree. 
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correct that our deference to the IJ on credibility questions is “expressly conditioned on 
support in the record,” Jishiashvili v. Att’y Gen., 402 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2005), and so 
we “expect . . . [IJs] . . . [to] confine[]” their decisionmaking to “evidence in the record” 
and not to venture into “impermissible conjecture.”  Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 
587, 598 (3d Cir. 2003).  And it does appear that the IJ here exceeded the bounds of the 
record.  We conclude, however, that this error is not a due process violation and thus is 
insufficient to disturb the IJ’s ultimate determination.  As the BIA explained, the IJ did 
not “rel[y] on either of th[ose] comments in his holding,” App. 3, and, for the reasons we 
have discussed, “it remains true that the IJ engaged in [an] otherwise appropriate adverse 
credibility determination[],” Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 598.  
 In sum, we conclude that the BIA did not err in upholding the IJ’s credibility 
determination.   
 B. The IJ’s Rejection of Corroborating Evidence 
 Singh challenges separately the IJ’s rejection of corroborating evidence in the 
form of affidavits from Singh’s family and acquaintances in India.  The IJ considered 
these affidavits, but found them “suspicious” on the grounds that they were all “very 
similar,” sharing the “same format as well as the same letterhead and typewriting.”  App. 
11.  While Singh argues we should reject this conclusion as “speculat[ion]” and “mere 
conjecture,” Pet. Br. 14, the IJ carefully examined each of the affidavits in question and 
based his conclusion on the undisputed similarities among them.  Under these 
circumstances, we agree with the BIA that the IJ’s rejection of the affidavits was 
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“supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as 
a whole.”  Alimbaev, 872 F.3d at 196.   
*      *      * 
 In sum, we conclude that both the IJ’s negative credibility finding and his rejection 
of the alleged corroborating evidence were supported by substantial evidence, and we 
therefore will uphold the BIA’s denial of Singh’s request for asylum.  As “the threshold 
for asylum is lower than for protection under the withholding of removal or CAT 
provisions,” our denial of Singh’s asylum request “necessarily requires that [his] CAT 
and withholding claims be rejected as well.”  Yu v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 349 (3d Cir. 
2008).  For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review will be denied.  
